Withdrawal Of A Plea And Conditional Pleas Overview Of Plea Bargaining The plea bargain is an agreement between a criminal defense attorney and the prosecution to resolve a criminal case and ends with a defendant pleading guilty or nolo contendre no contest in exchange for a reduced sentence or to a lesser charge.
Advantages[ edit ] Plea bargaining has been defended as a voluntary exchange Plea bargaining process leaves both parties better off, in that defendants have many procedural and substantive rights, but by pleading guilty, defendants "sell" these rights to the prosecutor.
For a defendant who believes that conviction is almost certain, a discount to the sentence is more useful than an unlikely chance of acquittal. Even when the charges are more serious, prosecutors often can still bluff defense attorneys and their clients into pleading guilty to a lesser offense.
As a result, people who might have been acquitted because of lack of evidence, but also who are in fact truly innocent, will often plead guilty to the charge. In a word, fear. And the more numerous and serious the charges, studies have shown, the greater the fear.
That explains why prosecutors sometimes seem to file every charge imaginable against defendants. Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than are necessary just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a few.
In the same way, they should never go ahead with a more serious charge just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious one.
The over-riding duty of the prosecutor is The procedures must command public and judicial confidence. Many defendants in serious and complex fraud cases are represented by solicitors experienced in commercial litigation, including negotiation. This means that the defendant is usually protected from being put under improper pressure to plead.
The main danger to be guarded against in these cases is that the prosecutor is persuaded to agree to a plea or a basis that is not in the public interest and interests of justice because it does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offending Any plea agreement must reflect the seriousness and extent of the offending and give the court adequate sentencing powers.
It must consider the impact of an agreement on victims and also the wider public, whilst respecting the rights of defendants.
Langbein argues that the modern American system of plea bargaining is comparable to the medieval European system of torture: There is, of course, a difference between having your limbs crushed if you refuse to confess, or suffering some extra years of imprisonment if you refuse to confess, but the difference is of degree, not kind.
Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive. Like the medieval Europeans, the Americans are now operating a procedural system that engages in condemnation without adjudication.
Often, precisely the prisoner's dilemma scenario applies: Arguably, the worst case is when only one party is guilty: The study concluded that "[t]his somewhat counterintuitive 'cost of innocence', where the preferences of innocents lead them collectively to fare worse than their guilty counterparts, is further increased by the practice of imposing much harsher sentences at trial on defendants who contest the charges.
This 'trial penalty' seeks to facilitate guilty pleas by guilty defendants [ Much research has focused on the relatively few actual cases where innocence was subsequently proven, such as successful appeals for murder and rape based upon DNA evidencewhich tend to be atypical of trials as a whole being by their nature only the most serious kinds of crime.
Other studies have focused on presenting hypothetical situations to subjects and asking what choice they would make.
More recently some studies have attempted to examine actual reactions of innocent persons generally, when faced with actual plea bargain decisions. A study by Dervan and Edkins attempted to recreate a real-life controlled plea bargain situation, rather than merely asking theoretical responses to a theoretical situation—a common approach in previous research.
Each subject was presented with the evidence of guilt and offered a choice between facing an academic ethics board and potentially a heavy penalty in terms of extra courses and other forfeits, or admitting guilt and accepting a lighter "sentence".
Our research, however, demonstrates that when study participants are placed in real, rather than hypothetical, bargaining situations and are presented with accurate information regarding their statistical probability of success, just as they might be so informed by their attorney or the government during a criminal plea negotiation, innocent defendants are highly risk-averse.
More pressure to plea bargain may be applied in weak cases where there is less certainty of both guilt and jury conviction than strong cases. Prosecutors tend to be strongly motivated by conviction rates, and "there are many indications that prosecutors are willing to go a long way to avoid losing cases, [and that] when prosecutors decide to proceed with such weak cases they are often willing to go a long way to assure that a plea bargain is struck".
For this reason,  [P]lea bargains are just as likely in strong and weak cases. Prosecutors only need to adjust the offer to the probability of conviction in order to reach an agreement. Thus, weaker cases result in more lenient plea bargains, and stronger ones in relative harshness, but both result in an agreement.
W]hen the case is weak, the parties must rely on charge bargaining But [charge bargaining] is hardly an obstacle. Charge bargaining in weak cases is not the exception; it is the norm all around the country.
Thus, even if the evidence against innocent defendants is, on average, weaker, the likelihood of plea bargains is not dependent on guilt. Another situation in which an innocent defendant may plead guilty is in the case of a defendant who cannot raise bail, and who is being held in custody in a jail or detention facility.
Because it may take months, or even years, for criminal cases to come to trial or even indictment in some jurisdictions, an innocent defendant who is offered a plea bargain that includes a sentence of less time than he would otherwise spend in jail awaiting an indictment or a trial may choose to accept the plea arrangement and plead guilty.
Moreover, prosecutors and defense attorneys often view each other as colleagues and generally wish to maintain good relations with one another.This bar-code number lets you verify that you're getting exactly the right version or edition of a book. The digit and digit formats both work.
Plea bargaining is used in hearing a criminal case to avoid a lengthy trial, where the prosecutor and the defendant would make an agreement by themselves, instead of taking the trial to a jury, often including things like pleading guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence or pleading to a lesser charge.
Plea Bargaining. The government and the defendant may agree to forego a trial and have the defendant enter a plea of guilty as part of a plea bargain.
Types of plea. The most common types of plea are "guilty" and "not guilty". Pleading guilty typically results in a more lenient punishment for the defendant; it is thus a type of mitigating factor in sentencing. A plea bargain is when a defendant makes a deal with the prosecution or court to plead guilty in exchange for a more lenient punishment, or for related charges against them to be dropped.
Plea bargaining is a completely private process when it takes place. This means that no one besides the defendant, the defense counsel, the prosecutor and sometimes the judge are present in the conference room; not even the victim of the defendant.
Plea bargaining, in law, the practice of negotiating an agreement between the prosecution and the defense whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or (in the case of multiple offenses) to one or more of the offenses charged in exchange for more lenient sentencing, recommendations, a specific sentence, or a dismissal of other charges.